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ACCIDENT AND MISTAKE
AS GROUNDS FOR RELIEF IN EQUITY.

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article

is

to treat of the nat-

ure of the accidents and mistakes which will give rise to the
exercise of equity jurisdiction.

No attempt has been made to

discuss the remedies incideAt'%to these classes of cases.
Though the aid of equity has been granted for accidents and
mistakes for several centuries,
and unsettled principles.

It

there yet remain many doubts

will be the writer's

task to

seek to clear these doubts and reconcile many of the conflicting adjudications;

to formulate general tests,

whereby it

may

be seen what cases come within, and those that are beyond,
the Jurisdiction of equity courts.
To enable the reader the better to understand the
subject as complete and correct

a definition as possible of

each branch of the subject will be given,

and this will be

followed by an analysis and explanation viewed in
of the discussions

the light

of this country and of England.

The subject proper,

definition of an accident.

then,

will be begun with a
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CHAPTER I.
AC O I DE N T
used in equity it

In the sense in which accident is

may be defined as an unforeseen and injurious event,
external to the parties affected by it,

occuring

and not attributable

to their mistake, negligence or misconduct; and whereby either
party, contrary to his own wishes or intention,
legal right,

and the other

or incurs some legal obligation,

acquires a corresponding legal right, which,

loses some

if

under the

circumstances, it were enforced, would be a violation of good
conscience.
It

will be seen that accident relates to facts wholly

external to the parties, and refers to some event which happened after the transaction took place and which caused a
change in the rights and liabilities of the parties, neither
expressed nor contemplated by the parties at the time of makFormerly it

ing the transaction in question.

was understood

that these facts were confined to act of Providence.

his is

not true today, and strictly speaking never was true.

Mr.

Story expresses the idea when he says that accidents extend
to unforeseen events, misfortunes,

loses,

acts or omissions,

which are not the result of negligence or misconduct of the
parties.

He has,

however,

expressed himself in terms that

are too broad and comprehensive to be correct,
vious that his classifications

for it

is

ob-

include many cases of mistake.

3
must not be understood that equity will afford

It

upon merely showing to.the court the ac-

must further appear that the parties have not

It

cident.

cases,

all

in

relief

been guilty of any negligence, or of any careless or thoughtwhereby they,

less dealings,
themselves

in

or either of them,

have involved

(Sims v.

unforeseen legal relations.

Lyle,

4

Wash. C. C. 320)
Nor will equity interfere when the parties have a
based upon one of

and adequate remedy at law; this is

full

the well known maxims of equity; or if power has been bestowed upon the law courts by statute,
accident,

to take cognizance

So in

equity,

he is

if

45 Ala.

488)

cases of contract where the party has uncon-

ditionally agreed to perform his part,
in

Hall,

(Hall v.

equity will be excldded.

of the

he can find no relief

by accident the subject matter is
For instance,-

himself incapicitated.

conditionally agrees to build a house,

if

destroyed,

or

a party un-

and before the same is

finished it is by accident destroyed; he must suffer the loss
and rebuild.

This is

due partly to the rigid rule of law

which requires parties to fulfill

absolute promises,

and part-

ly to the person's neglect in not inserting conditional elatses.

This latter class of cases must not be confused
with forfeitures for the non-performance

of a covenant by a

certain fixed day; equity will grant relief when the breach
can be compensated in damages.
ion is

clear;

in the first

The reason for this distinct-

case the party seeks to avoid the

obligation imposed by his agreement,

as in

the common case of

4
the lessee seeking to avoid the payment of rent after accidental destruction of the premises.
it

is

not the obligation,

he seeks to avoid,
If

but the penalty or forfeiture which

and equity will aid him.

the party against whom relief is

equal equities,
other party,

But in the second case

sought is

upon

and entitled to equal protection with the

equity will not exercise

its jurisdiction.

In a

case where an imperfect will was sought to be established
against an innocent heir at law, equity refused to take cognizance because the heir was entitled by law to possession,
and enjoyment, of the estate.
currence is

Another case of frequent oc-

that of a bona fide purchaser for value and with-

out notice; an equity of which he was unaware cannot be set
up against him.
It is more difficult to tell of what cases equity
will take cognizance than to point out the few well defined
instances which come within the jurisdiction of equity.

No

general classification of cases can be made which will be
comprehensive enough to include all the instances within the
scope of equity.

A discussion of the cases in which aid may

be obtained from equity will now be taken up.
Relief may be had in cases of lost instruments,
sealed or otherwise; when penalties have been incurred; when
powers have been defectively executed.
Under this first head come deeds,
cords,

promissory notes,

sume jurisdiction in

all

and wills.

bonds,

court re-

But equity will not as-

cases of this kind.

It

must be shown
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by affidavit that the instrument was lost and an offer of inone is

necessary,

demnity,

if

there is

proof that there is

is

made,

and then only when

no remedy at law or no remedy

which is adequate or adapted to the best adjustment of the
rights of the parties.
The jurisdiction of equity is most frequently
inThe juris-

voked in the case of loss of sealed instruments.
diction was at first

based upon two grounds,- first, because

the common law required profert of all sealed instruments to
entitle the plaintiff to maintain his action.
was impossible when a loss occurred.

This, of course,

Equity never followed

the law procedure in requiring a profert, so the parties natural resort was to equity.

Second, because it was but just

that, for the protection of the defendant the plaintiff should
indemnify him against any future loss or liability by reason
of a subsequent finding of the instrument.

A law court could

not properly or effectually demand the indemnity; while it
certainly is within the province of equity to decree a bond
of indemnity.
with,

yet this,

Though it

is

in theory,

true that profert is

dispensed

does not affect the jurisdiction

of equity. (Livingston v. Livingston, 4 John. Ch. 294;
v. City of Elizabeth, 27 N. J. Eq. 408)

Force

A distinction is made in cases of sealed instruments between bills for discovery and bills for relief.
the first case equity is
demnity is
fore,

only supplemental to law,

required upon filing the bill.

It

and no in-

cannot,

deprive the law courts of their jurisdiction.

In

thereBut if
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the bill

prays for relief,

or for a discovery and relief,

then the bill seeks to change the forum of law to equity and
the law is

deprived of any further control in

the matter.

The next instance of lost instruments is that of
promissory notes,

bills

of exchange and checks.

Here again

equity assumes jurisdiction on the ground of indemnity.

The

loss must have occurred before maturity and it is immaterial
whether the note is payable to bearer, endorsed in blank, or
not endorsed at all.

There is a difference of opinion in

case of non-negotiable notes,

many of the jurisdictions hold-

ing that since the note was a mere evidence of debt between
the parties, and an action at law could be maintained without
requiring any indemnity,

and in

case of assignment

of such a

note the assignee takes subject to all the equities maintainable against

the original assignor,

equity had no jurisdiction.

This exception is not supported by a majority of the American
States,

nor should it

be,

for the party has the right to have

delivered to him the original bill,

as a receipt of payment;

furthermore the defendant may, by lapse of time or other casualties,

be prevented from establishing his equities,

will,

any case,

in

be put to a great inconvenienm

forth such equities.
Allen v.
J.

Eq.

Smith,

(Arckman v. Painter,

29 Ark.

408; Hardman v.
In New York,

ed the code procedure,

74; Force v.
Rattenby,

and he

to set

11 W. Va.

386;

City of Elizabeth,

27 N.

53 Ga. 36)

and in all the states which have adoptjurisdiction is

given to the law courts.

Section 1917 of the New York Civil Code provides that oral
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evidence may be introduced to prove the contents of a note or
bill

which has been lost,

and an undertaking must be given.

In case of court records the rule seems to be uniform to the effect that equity cannot supply those lost by
accident.

(Clingham v.

13 Fla. 327)

Hopkie,

152; Kean v.

78 Ill.

Jordan,

But Grant v. Lynch (45 Ala. 204) seems to cir-

cumvent this in part by saying that equity may,

in a suit be-

tween the same parties, confirm by decree the title and grant
other necessary relief, when the title

in question depended

upon a judicial sale and the records ordering the sale have
been lost by accident.
Among the first cases in which equity exercised
jurisdiction were penalties and forfeitures.

As early as the

r6ign of Phillip and Mary bills were filed in equity praying
for relief expressly on the ground of accident.
growth of equity it

But by the

has general jurisdiction in nearly all

cases of this nature,

no matter upon what ground the relief

is

is

sought,

so that

it

no longer of much importance to know

that equity will take cognizance of these cases on account of
accident.

Care must be taken,

however,

to distinguish penal-

ties from liquidated damages; from agreements to reduce a
debt upon the prompt payment of the agreed sum; and from agreements to accelerate payment of an existing debt; for in neithof these instances will equity interfere.
While equity willingly aids a party seeking to avoid
a penalty

incurred by accident,

it

will never aid in

forcement

of a penalty or forfeiture,

the en-

by reason of the maxim

that-he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
The cases arising from the defective execution of
powers forms an interesting group, for the correction of which
equity will take jurisdiction.
again in

Mistake,

that time.

But as these cases come up

the discussion of them will be reserved for

Suffice it

said concerning Mistake,

here to remark that whatever is
applies equally well in

then

cases of

Amcident.
The above groups are the only attempts at classification of these cases which may be practicable.

There are

still many miscellaneous instances, some of which it will be
interesting to examine.
Thus,

where a person in a fiduciary relation has

paid debts, distributive shares, and part of the legacies,
relying upon the sufficiency

of the estate,

quently rendered insufficient,
by theft,

destruction,

which is

subse-

through no fault of his own,

or other unusual occurrence,

equity

will relieve him from liability.
In

Pooley v.

was paid by Ray in

Ray,

Adm.

(IP.

Wm.

355)

a mortgage

obedience to a decree of court;

it

was

afterwards discovered that about one half the sum had been

paid.

The legatee filed a bill to recover the part paid

twice,

and equity granted his prayer.
Chancellor Oowper,

447)

says,

that if

in Edwards v. Freeman (2 P.

Win.

an executor has paid a legacy on the sup-

position that the estate is

sufficient,

and it

appears later

there were not enough assets, the executor may recover the
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legacy paid.

In Clough v. Bond administration was granted to

a wife and her brother; the proceeds were jointly deposited tn
a bank; the brother drew out the money and absconded.

Equity

went so far as to hold the estate of the administratrix's
husband liable for the loss arising from the accident.
Equity has interfered to prevent the execution of a
judgment obtained when,by accidentthe defense could not be
set up.

Thus,

where a person found money 'n a railroad train

and delivered it
er.

to the company to be turned over to the los-

Upon failure to do this the finder sued the company and

received a verdict.

Before the execution the loser claimed

the money and the company was allowed in equity to defeat the
execution upon the ground that it

was an accident that this

defendant did not know of the loser's claim at the time of
trial.

(N. Y.

& H. R.

Also,

R. R. v.

Haws,

56 N. Y. 175)

when the plaintiff in an attachment

receives

a judgment at law, by concealing the validity of the claim,
equity will interpose to protect the defendant against the
judgment,
validity.

because he was unable to set up the defense of inThe concealment did not amount to a fraud.

bert v. Herbert,

49 N. J. Eq.

When the bill

(Her-.

70)

in equity shows that evidence of which

the defendant and his attorney were entirely ignorant and
which would have materially reduced the judgment,
discovered after judgment rendered,

equity will stay the exe-

cution and adjust the rights of the parties.
R. R. v. Titus, 27 N. J. Eq. 102)

had been

(Cairo & Fulton

IO

There are a few cases of forfeitures which do not
properly come under the preceding discussion of that head.
When a life policy was to be forfeited after non-payment
premium,

of a

the subsequent insanity of the insured preventing

the payment of such premium, was sufficient in equity to prevent the forfeiture.
82 N. Y. 182)

(Wheeler v.

Qommer.

Mut.

L.

Ins.

Co.,

And in cases of forfeiture for non-payment of

rent, though the lessee had expressly waived the notice, yet
equity said that notice was necessary to make the forfeiture
valid and ignorance of this fact as a defense was such an accident as to defeat the forfeiture.

(Palmer v.

Ford,

70 Ill.

369).
Many specific instances might yet be given in which
equity has exercised jurisdiction on grounds of accident, but
perhaps it

will be more profitable to formulate a general

rule or test,

as nearly correct as the nature of such a rule

will permit.

Whenever a party seeking relief has a clear

right,

which cannot otherwise be enforcbd in a suitable or

adequate manner;
fiable loss,

or when he would be subjected to an unjusti-

due to no fault or misconduct of his own; or

where he has an equity superior to the party against whom he
seeks relief; he may then invoke the assistance of equity,
whenever such circumstances arise from accident.

11

CHAPTER II.
MISTAKE
We pass now to the second part of this discussion,
Mistake.

The courts of equity have,

from an early period,

exercised its jurisdiction in this class of cases.
case arose in the time of Edward IV in 1 Cal. 3.

The first
In this

case it was the intention of the parties to draw a bond for
future services,
services.

but by mistake the bond read for present

This was the origin of the doctrine that mistake

in sealed instruments could be corrected in equity.

The

grounds for the jurisdiction in such a case were two,- first,
the sanctity of seals at common law forbade the latter from
interfering; second, if the law courts did take cognizance of
the matter, it would be only to declare the instrument a
nullity for want of real consent.
work injustice

than justice,

This would more frequently

so equity took the matter in

charge and reformed the instrument, conforming it to the real
intention of the parties.
Of the various definitions of mistake the following,
taken from Pomeroy's Eq.

accurate:tion,

Juris.,

seems the most complete and

"Mistake is an erroneous mental condition,

or conviction,

induced by ignorance,

concep-

misapprehension,

or misunderstanding of the truth, but without negligence,
resulting in some act or omission done,
ly by one,

and

or suffered erroneous-

or both parties to a transaction,

but without its

12

erroneous character being intended or known as the time."
Mr. Story adds surprise, imposition or misplaced confidence,
as three other circumstances which produce mistake.

This ob-

viously is not correct, since imposition and misplaced confidence more properly belong to fraud, and relief should be
sought on that ground.

It is only when no element of fraud,

either actual or constructive, exists, that relief may be obtained purely on the basis of mistake.

The most natural

division of this subject, and the one to be followed here, is
mistakes of law and mistakes of fact.
A great deal of difficulty and obscurity surrounds
the application of that familiar maxim of law laid down in
Manser's Case (2 Coke 3), "Ignorentia legis neminem excusat",
to courts of equity.Though it is almost literally enforced at
law it loses its rigor to some extent when applied to equity.
In consequence of this relaxation two classes of exceptions
have become well established,- first, a party is not bound to
know of a private statute, or, second, the law of a foreign
(Hasen v. Foster, 9 Pick. III; Morgan v.

state or nation.
Bell, 3 Wash. 556)

From this same laxity of construction the general
rule prevails, both in England and America, that equity will
allow a relief from a mere mistake of law, when it is within
the discretion of the court, and then to be exercised only in
the most unquestionable and flagrant cases.

(Snell v. In.

Co., 98 U. S. 90; Story, I Eq. Juris. Sec. 138; Porneroy, Vol.
II,

Sees.

843

-

847; Griswold v.

Hazard,

141 U. S.

284)

13
The United States Supreme Court has by well considered adjudications clearly set forth this distinction in applying the above maxim to suits in
manier Admin.

In

equity.

Hunt v.

Rous-

C 8 Wheat.174 ) a creditor took a power of at-

torney for the sale of a ship under advice of counsel that
that would secure him as well as a mortgage.

The debtor

shortly .afterward died and the power of attorney was revoked
by the death.

Hunt then sought the equity court to have the

instrument reformed.

Relief was refused on the ground that

the nature of the two instruments was a matter of general law.
In
284)

the second case,

one Durant was arrested

Griswold V.

Hazard

(141 U. S.

in New Port on a ne exeat.

Griswold, who was but slightly acquainted with Durat, was
asked by his nephew,

a great friend of Durant,

Griswold went to the jail

to give bail.

Saturday night for the purpose of

giving bail to keep Durant out of jail on Sunday, and on the
understanding

that the latter

diction of the court.

would remain within the juris-

The instrument was drawn up by Hazard's

attorney and read "to abide and perform the decrees
court."

There was no mistake in drawing the bond,

woldupon reading it,

of the
but Gris-

believed that "perform" meant to answer

for the appearance of Durant and according to the evidence
both parties were mutually mistaken as to the legal import of
the words used.

The court held that it

would be very ineq-

uitable to hold Griswold as surety for any decrees which
might be rendered against Durant,

when his real intention was

to answer only for his appearance in court, and he was excused

14
from his bond.
sight these two cases seem to be in

At first

but upon a closer study it

conflict,

al plausible

theories may,

to reconcile

the two decisions,

direct

will be seen that sever-

and have been,

advanced,

seeking

and not without success.

Perhaps the easiest of these explanations is, that in the maNim, "Ignorentia puris neminem haut excusat" the word "juris"
means a public law as distinguished from a private right,
to which the maxim is

claimed to have no reference.

advanced by Lord Westbury in
H. L. 149

-

Cooper v.

Phillips,

This was

(L.

R.

2

170) and again by Lord Chancellor King in the

famous case of Lansdowne v. Lansdowne,
facts of the latter
was the eldest

case,
son

(

briefly stated,

Mosley,
are,-

364 )

The

the plaintiff

of the intestate; he had a dispute

with the younger brother of the intestate, his uncle, as to
who should have the property.
one Hughes,
"Clerks'

a school-master,

Remembrancer"

never ascend,

who consulted a book called

and advised that the property would

and farther stated that the property belonged

to the younger brother.
land.

They referred the matter to

When the plaintiff

They therefore agreed to share the
discovered the mistake the court'

allowed him to cancel the agreements and take possession of
the whole.
This distinction,
which it

emanates.,

notwithstanding~authonity from

cannot justly be sustained.

Is not a

party made to suffer just as great an inequity in the case of
a general law, when relief is

refused,

as he would in case of
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a private right or statute?

Why cannot the circumstances

which prevent a recovery or remedial equity in
lic

case of a pub-

law be applied with equal force and justice

private right?

There seems to be no apparent

in

case

of a

or inherent

difference between the two classes of law to warrant the distinction.
The theory advanced by the American jurists,

Mr.

Bigelow (1 L. Q. Rev. 298) and Mr. Pomeroy, is that in the
first

case the party plaintiff

had the choice

of two distinct

classes of securities, and he chose, though under mistake, as
to the legal import of the security,
cure him,

and having done so the courts justly refuse to

create a new instrument,
But in

the one less apt to se-

or contract,

between the parties.

the later case the party had no choice;

he was not

mistaken as to the legal import of the instrument he intended
to execute,

namely,

a bail bond; but he was mistaken as to

the legal import of the terms used.

In

this case to reform

the bond was not to create a new contract

for the parties,

but to carry out the contract the parties really
make.

This certainly

is

intended to

easily deduced for a comparative

study of the cases and is in harmony with the policy and prac-

tice of courts of equity.

That is,

that equity will enforce

the intent as gathered from the evidence,

but will never

create new obligations between the parties.
another dis tinct ion which may be drawn,

There is

yet

and the one which

seems to be the true criterion to determine equitable jurisdiction in

questions of this character.

It

may be thus stat-

16
ed,-

Equity will not interfere

take of law,

pure and simple,

to grant relief

case of mis-

will very readily seize

but it

upon any additional circumstances,

in

or equities,

for the pur-

pose of acquiring jurisidiction and granting the proper relief.
Mr.

P~meroy (Sec.

ventures to give the follow-

849)

ing as a criterion to determine when equity will interfere in
cases of private right.

"Whenever a person is

ignorant or

mistaken with respect to his own antecedent or existing private rights,

interests, estates, duties, liabitities, or oth-

er relations,

either of property or of contract,

sonal status,

and enters

into some transaction,

or of perthe legal

scope and operation of which he wrongly comprehends and understands, for the purpose of such assumed rights, interest,
etc., or for carrying out such assumed duties, or liabilities, equity will grant its relief, defensive or affirmative,
treating the mistake as analogous
a mistake

of fact."

to,

if

not

identical with,

The writer refrains from further comment

than to say that this rdle is

supported by a long line of

eminent decisions and accords with the more general rule just

previously stated.
It

is well to consider here some of the specific

instances in which relief has been sought in equity,for the
purpose of learning what amounts to a mistake of law,

and in

what general class of cases equity will.

inter-

fere.

In Webb v.

city in Virginia,

Alexandria

or will not,

(33 Grat.168)

issued bonds

the defendant,

in lieu of others which had

a
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been sold by order of the court under the confiscation act.
The United States court held such bonds invalid.

The city

then sought to restrain Webb from transfering some of the
bonds in his possession, and to have the same cancelled.

The

court granted the relief upon the ground of surprise and that
the city ought not to be held to know what the court would
decide in so novel a case.
grant

relief

The New York courts refuse to

upon grounds of surprise,

would open the gates to a ceaseless
obs v.

Morange,

where relief
case

47 N. Y.

saying that

flow of litigation.

As this Virginia

the courts will sometimes grant relief

the law is very doubtful or undecided.
nized by Lord Chelmsford in
Winn, (L. R. 6 H. L.

(Jac-

57)And generally the cases are few

has been granted for surprise.

indicates,

to do so

when

This was first recog-

the noted case of Beaucamp v.

223 - 224) when he said that though the

court has established a rule for the construction of a deed,
yet ignorance of what that construction would be ought not to
deprive

the party of relief

for his mistake.

When parties are in doubt as to what their legal
rights are, and with a rivw of peaceably adjusting the same,
enter into a compromise,

neither party will be heardto com-

plain upon discovering that his surrendered rights were valid
and capable of enforcement.
equity will not interfere,

And so in family arrangements,
even though made upon grounds

which would justify interference
by v.

Westby,

in case of strangers.

2 D. & W. 503; Shartel's Appeal,

(West-

64 Pa. 25)

The courts even go so far as to say that the parties

18
need have no right at all,

if

they only honestly believe that

and being in doubt,

either has,

enter into a compromise.

Both the English and American doctrines are illustrated by
the leading case of Rullen v.

Ready (2 Atk.

There sev-

587).

eral children, bel±kving that all were equally entitled to
property left by will,

divided the same.

But one of the sons

had married and this was made a ground of forfeiture by the
will.

but the legal con-

The fact of the marriage was known,

sequence was not.

The court refused to set aside the arrange-

ment.
It

is

too well settled that money paid under mis-

take of law cannot be recovered, to need any farther discussion
here.
We pass now to a consideration of the second division of this head,- mistake of fact.

A mistake of fact is a

mistake not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part
of the party making the same,

and consisting in an uncon-

sciousness, ignorance, or forgetfullness of a fact, past or
present, material to the transaction, or in the belief in the
present existence of a thing material,
ence of a thing not now existing.

or in the past ekist-

(Kerr

-

Fraud and Mistake,

Sec. 406)
The exercise of jurisdiction of equity in
mistake of fact is
of law,

for in

the reverse of that in

the former case it

is

court to withhold its jurisdiction.

cases of

cases of mistake

the exception for the
So that it

would nec-

essitate a complete digest to give all the instances in which
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the aid of equity may be had.

It

will be better to consider

the cases from a negative standpoint,

considering only those

in which no relief will be granted, always keeping in mind
the test laid down in the Illinois cases,

to the effect

the jurisdiction depends upon the adequacy

that

of the remedy at

law?4.
In
chancery,

Foster v.

by mistake,

Clark,

(79

Ill.

mistake was purely equitable.
131)

the master in

omitted a parcel of land in

given under a mortgage foreclosure.

Ill.

225)

The correction

But in Croft v.

of this

Dickens,

the court refused to correct a mistake

tachment bond,

the deed

(78

in an at-

because the party would have by motion amended

the bond at common law,
the remedy at law,

and having failed to avail himself of

he cannot secure the aid of equity.

There may be two very general classes of mistake
made,

of this nature,

one as to the subject matter,

as to the terms of the contract.

In

the first

instance

parties have fully expressed their intentions,
taken as to the existence,

size,

identity of the subject matter.

shape,

amount,

in

other
the

but are misprice,

or

In the second case they have

agreed to terms concerning a proper subject matter,
fault

the

but by

reducing the terms to writing a mistake occurs as to

the addition,

omission,

or misunderstanding

of the terms used.

In one case the intention in founded upon error
or the intention is

erroneously

would be recission in
cond, case.

the first,

expressed.

-

in the oth-

The proper remedy

and reformation in

the se-
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must be shown that

But to be entitled to relief it

the case comes under the general rule as limited by the following qualifications.
The fact must be material,

(I)
than law

will not trouble

be material

it

itself

for equity-

about little

no more
things.

To

must go to the very essence of the contract

and materially affect the rights of the parties.
(2)

The party seeking relief

with any negligence
doctrine

is

must not be chargeable

connected with the mistake.

that though the party is

The New York

negligent he may recover

provided that he leaves the other party in as good a position
as he was before the mistake.
(3)

When one party is

(Maher v.

Mayor,63 N. Y. 455)

acquainted with the facts and in-

nocently lets the other fall

into mistake,

no relief can be

had unless the party was under legal obligations

to disclose

the facts.
(4)

When the parties have

equal means of knowledge and

deal at arm's length with each other,
consequences
(5)

of any mistakes.

The mistake must be mutual.

to mean that if
if

"Mutual" is qualified

the party seeks to reform,

unilateral he may only rescind.

17 John.

they must abide-the

373; Nevins v.

Dunlap,

it

(Lyman v.

must be mutual;
United Ins.

Co.,

33 N. Y. 676)

The general ground upon which these distinctions
are based is

that mistakes or ignorance

of facts are proper

subjects for relief only when they constitute a material ingredient

to the contract,

or disappoint

the parties'

intention

21
or where

by error,

it

is

violates the obligations

imposed by law upon the conscience

But where the parties are on an equal foot-

of the parties.
ing,

and have equal facilities

there

is

or

inconsistent with good faith,

for knowing all

no surprise or imposition,

ground for the interference

there

of equity.

is

the facts,

and

not a proper

This latter

class

in-

cludes those cases where doubt and uncertainty about the subject matter exists, and extends to family arrangements and
compromises,

unless one party gains an unconscionable

tage over the other.

advan-

Nor will equity act to relieve a party

mistaken as to his expectations, or benefits arising from the
agreement, or to his motives for entering into the same.

The

New York Supreme Court has a peculiar doctrine somewhat
along this line,
1894).

It

is,

decided in Davis v.

Kling,

(74 Hun.

598

-

that a person may be mistaken as to an expect-

ation, or a fact expected to occur in the future, as well as
to a fact already occurred.

It

ts an extreme case and the

above was the only theory whereby the court could render
equity to the defendant,
There

is

to which he was obviously entitled.

only one class of cases under this head

to which special attention need be called;

ive execution of powers.
are of two kinds,

namely,

the defect-

The defects which are remediable

first, where the donee has executed one in-

strument,

from which the intent to execute the power may be

inferred,

but the instrument itself is

p±riate,

(Tollet v. Tollet,

where there

is

a defect

in

informal or inappro-

1 Smith's fl. C. 254); second,
the execution of a formal instru-
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ment.

(Chance on Powers, Sees. 2878, 9,

86, 90)

It will be seen from the above that the defects are
made formal defects and that some instrument is requisite, so
equity will not interfere in

the non-execution

of a power,

as

in the case where a party merely expresses his intention to
execute the power without taking any farther steps to indicate the fulfillment of his intention.
The citation under the first
tive case.

head is

the illustra-

The donee executed to one Tollet a power by will,
and the courts sus-

which should have been executed by deed,

tained the execution;farther stating that the reverse would
not be aiddd in equity, for by a deed the donee would put beyond his power to control the subject matter of the power,
and would be unable to properly execute

the same.

Instances of the second class are very numerous,
arising from the omission of a seal, or a signature, or a too
small number of witnesses.

The anomalous character

of this

class of mistakes consists in the definiteness of the specific cases in which equity will interfere to aid certain persons.

It

purchaser,

will exercise

jurisdiction in

favor of a bona fide

including mortgagor and lessee,

of creditors,

wife,

of a legitimate child,

hand,

relief has been denied when the execution was in favor

of the donee himself,
ther or sister,
stranger.

and of a charity.

of a

of a husband,

illegitimate child,

or any remote relative,

In short,

On the other

bro-

or mere volunteer or

jurisdiction will be entertained only in

the five cases given above.

(See cases in

Shell's Eq.,

p 362)
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The single exception

is

in

favor of a volunteer,

when by accident the formal execution was rendered
ble.

(Fonb.

Eq.

338,

note

impossi-

(h))

The general rule may be stated that if the party
seeking relief has a greater equity, and the defect is not of
the essence

of the power,

and the execution

thereof will not

defeat the real intent of the donee, equity will lend its aid
to a meritorious party.
Equity has always been very free to relieve against
mistakes

in wills,

instrument,

when they are apparent

on the face of the

or may be shown by the proper construction.

But

the evidence in such cases must be very clear And unequivocal.
The rule was but recently laid down in -the New York Supreme
Court,

that equity will not relieve against a mistake of

fact unless it
of evidence

is

than is

tan Elevated R. R.
In

made to appear by a greater preponderance
required in
v.

closing,

Johnson,

other civil actions*
84 Hun.

183-

Manhat-

1895)

the writer would say that he has attempt-

ed to set forth clearly and £ofrcibly

the general doctrines

and rules governing the subjects under consideration.

While

he regrets that the time and space would not allow a fuller

discussion of this interesting branch of equity jurisprudence,
yet he will feel well repaid if

the reader is

to any extent

enabled to free himself of any doubts relative to these subjects by the perusab of this article.

